Vol. 143, No. 33 — August 15, 2009

Vancouver 2010 Aviation Security Regulations

Statutory authorities

Aeronautics Act and Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Act

Sponsoring department

Department of Transport

REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS STATEMENT

(This statement is not part of the Regulations.)

Executive summary

Issue

The RCMP, as the federally mandated agency to lead security planning for the 2010 Games, formed the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit (V2010 ISU) in 2003, uniting police, military, and security agencies under a broad mandate to secure the 2010 Games.

The RCMP’s overall security posture is based on assessments of the threat environment, international best practices, lessons learned from previous Games, observations at Beijing and Salt Lake City Olympics and comparable major, international events.

There have been three years of RCMP-led interagency planning among aviation security partners. The RCMP’s domestic partners are Transport Canada (TC), Department of National Defence (DND), North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), NAV Canada and CATSA. American authorities have also been engaged, namely the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

The V2010 ISU identified three groups of threat scenarios tied to aircraft. There were (1) use of aircraft as a weapon; (2) use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against passengers at Vancouver International Airport or aboard aircraft bound for greater Vancouver; and (3) use of aircraft for suicide attacks mounted against 2010 Games venues.

Transport Canada is the sole agency with the statutory authority to regulate safety and security requirements for all manner of civil aviation, both commercial and private, operating to, from and within Canada. As such, Transport Canada alone has the ability to create temporary regulations designed to address and mitigate the threat scenarios identified by the RCMP.

Objectives

Most existing aviation security regulations do not apply to operators of non-commercial aircraft and the smaller aerodromes from which they operate. Many of these operators will be flying in what will be restricted airspace during the duration of the 2010 Games. The proposed Regulations are considered necessary to address specific concerns identified by the RCMP for these aircraft operating in restricted airspace above Vancouver, Whistler and a corridor linking them (a region called the Olympic Control Area or OCA) for the duration of the 2010 Games period, January 29 through March 3, 2010, inclusively.

The objective of the proposed Regulations is to prevent unlawful acts of interference with aviation or the 2010 Games using smaller aircraft that are not subjected to the full range of existing aviation security requirements. In the RCMP-led threat scenarios, it was determined that a wide variety of these generally smaller aircraft could be used for nefarious purposes, including helicopters, corporate aircraft, cargo aircraft, floatplanes, air taxis, small commuter aircraft, private charter and general aviation aircraft.

Description

To facilitate the continued movement of this air traffic, Transport Canada proposes to mitigate risks by introducing a suite of temporary security requirements for these smaller air operations if they enter restricted airspace above Vancouver, Whistler and a corridor in between during the 2010 Games. Briefly put, the risks involve the use of aircraft as a weapon or as a weapons platform.

The proposed Regulations are necessary to

• Temporarily require the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) to screen persons and goods at additional aerodromes in British Columbia and expand passenger screening to additional areas of airports that currently have CATSA screening (e.g. the general aviation area at Victoria airport);
• Require the post-screening segregation of passengers, and belongings and other goods going on board an aircraft;
• Require aircraft searches; and
• Expand the prohibitions respecting firearms and explosives to operators of non-commercial (corporate and private) aircraft and aerodromes that do not serve air carriers.

Security-sensitive requirements containing more details and procedures would be contained in confidential security measures and disclosed only to authorized persons with a demonstrable “need to know” of their contents.

Access to the OCA would be controlled from airfield, helipad and floatplane operations within the OCA and from “portal” airports located outside the restricted perimeter. In essence, these portal airports would serve as filters for non-screened flights so that they can be rendered secure and allowed into the OCA.

Specific affected parties would be segments of the air transportation industry (e.g. fixed-wing commuter air services and helicopters) that are not currently screened, including passengers onboard these flights, the employees servicing them, and the aircraft crews.

Aerodromes affected (see Annex 1) would include small airports, heliports, and float bases that would host temporary screening services for the duration of the 2010 Games period. Other airports would have additional screening checkpoints established to screen traffic located away from the main air terminal buildings.

The proposed security regime does not propose to set up temporary CATSA screening facilities at all air operations and aerodromes currently offering service directly to sites in the vicinity of Vancouver and Whistler. Instead, flights from these small-volume aerodromes would be re-routed to obtain screening services at “portal” airports prior to entering restricted airspace. These portal airports (e.g. Abbotsford and Victoria) would serve as the primary re-direction points for affected aircraft seeking permission to enter the OCA.

Under the proposed Regulations, CATSA would establish temporary screening operations at 22 new sites (see Annexes 1 and 2) spanning the Lower Mainland, Vancouver Island, Northern British Columbia and Calgary.

Regulatory and non-regulatory options considered

Non-regulatory options were not considered, given the results of RCMP-led threat assessments and the underlying premise behind the creation of the OCA. All commercial and private aircraft seeking to enter restricted airspace must be screened beforehand to mitigate potential use of aircraft in terrorist attacks and other threats to civil aviation. The only exemptions would be emergency-response aircraft.

Without the implementation of a 2010 Games–specific aviation security regime through the creation of temporary regulations, certain passengers and goods would be grounded, which would impose significant constraints on the livelihood of small commercial operators ranging from floatplanes and air taxies to small charter operations and helicopters.

This forced grounding would also effectively forbid charter and corporate aircraft from flying into Greater Vancouver, potentially damaging Canada’s reputation as a business-friendly destination and negatively impact future tourism and investment potential.

The proposed Regulations were designed to achieve a suitable level of aviation security and air operations in a manner that does not overshadow the positive and high profile nature of the 2010 Games. The creation of the OCA with the associated security requirements is considered an innovative and adaptive approach to enable otherwise-banned aviation traffic to continue to operate.

Benefits and costs

These proposed Regulations would complement airspace restrictions and would provide security for air operations that would otherwise be prohibited from entering or operating in the OCA.

Costs to affected parties

All flights entering the restricted OCA airspace would be subject to screening requirements for crew members, passengers and goods. Parties highly affected by the proposed Regulations would be segments of the air transportation industry located outside of typically larger, commercial passenger-carrying operations that are already screened. Specifically, this would include operators of floatplanes, helicopters, small commuter aircraft and air taxis, corporate and privately owned aircraft, and training flights.

Passengers onboard these flights, the employees servicing them, and the aircraft crews would also be significantly affected by the proposed Regulations. Affected sites would include general aviation facilities, heliports, float bases and other smaller, regional aerodromes that would host temporary screening operations. Some airports with existing screening checkpoints would have additional checkpoints established to screen aircraft departing from areas located away from air terminal buildings. (See Annex 1.)

In addition, some air operators from specific aerodromes are currently flying directly to sites in the vicinity of Vancouver and Whistler that would not host temporary screening facilities. As a result, traffic that normally flies directly to Vancouver from these aerodromes would be first re-routed to obtain screening services elsewhere before they can enter the OCA. (See Annex 2.)

Affected air operators and passengers can expect flight delays and longer flight times to portal airports. Floatplane operators, helicopter companies, small regional carriers and others may incur additional ground handling, landing or airport fees.

It is worth noting that the list of temporary CATSA screening facilities contained in both Annexes remains subject to change. Additional sites may be added if deemed necessary to better accommodate aviation industry needs and/or changes to RCMP-led threat assessments. Additional portal airports could also be added, if necessary, to accommodate changes in passenger volume, routes, available runways and need for greater runway lengths. Changes in the availability of essential services (e.g. aircraft de-icing, aircraft fuelling and Customs services) could also add or subtract from the list of 22 aerodromes with 2010 Games–specific CATSA services.

Given the amount of additional air traffic expected as a result of the 2010 Games and the involvement of numerous Government of Canada departments, the list of parties affected by the proposed Regulations is extensive.

While more than 100 federal agencies and departments are involved in the 2010 Games, five departments and agencies are principally engaged in ensuring transportation of aircraft into, around and out of the OCA. These are Transport Canada, CATSA, RCMP, DND and CBSA. For these five, creating and implementing an appropriate aviation security regime involves significant staffing, planning, training, equipment, accommodation and resource allocation costs.

It is expected that the proposed aviation security regulations would impact primarily aircraft having up to 50 seats. However, the majority of aircraft affected will likely have a capacity of less than 10 seats and be operated by small regional airlines, float plane operators, helicopter companies and charter providers. These affected operators typically offer flights to smaller or private aerodromes where CATSA does not provide screening.

Flight schools would also be highly impacted, given proposed restrictions on their operations and the potential for temporarily reduced revenue streams. Solo flights could be curtailed and aircraft flown by student pilots would be banned from the proximity of key Games facilities and other locations.

Operators of corporate aircraft (some of whom fly large aircraft, the type used by major commercial carriers) may also be affected by the same type of flight delays, longer flight times to portal airports and additional ground-handling fees.

Costs: Identification and description

The number of impacted flights has been estimated at 100-plus flights per day. The number of impacted passengers is estimated at approximately 1 000 to 4 000 passengers per day, since the affected aircraft would be generally much smaller in size than those used by major carriers.

The restrictions themselves would only be in place for 34 days, which would limit the economic impact on communities, industry and the travelling public.

Smaller airlines (e.g. Pacific Coastal Airlines) that would be subjected to the proposed Regulations can expect time delays at aerodromes, longer flight times, additional aircraft cycles, and reductions in operational efficiency and equipment utilization. The same costs would be felt by affected operators of helicopters, float planes, charters, commuters and air taxis, and corporate and privately owned aircraft. Aerodrome and air operator employees would also need to be trained to carry out their new security obligations. In addition, re-routing to portal airports to obtain screening services prior to entering restricted airspace could result in additional ground handling and landing fees for aircraft operators.

Special arrangements would be in place to ensure that emergency and first-responder air operations (such as medevac flights) are not negatively affected by the proposed Regulations. Alternative security requirements of a confidential nature are proposed for these and other air operations that provide essential services and goods to communities in British Columbia.

Aerodromes at which CATSA will conduct additional temporary screening may need to dedicate space and resources to create checkpoints, passenger waiting areas and other facilities in support of the proposed Regulations. Depending on the facility, costs could include the provision of space and utilities, such as electricity, for screening equipment and operation; infrastructure or staff to keep passenger and goods that have been screened segregated and protected from unauthorized access; logistical and coordination costs; and potential additional staffing and overtime costs.

Passengers on previously unscreened flights would be affected by potential delays and longer travel times between Vancouver and nearby locations. There is also the potential that increased operating costs may be passed on to passengers and to persons shipping goods.

Through the participation of 100-plus agencies, the Government of Canada has already made and would continue to make significant commitments to staffing, training, infrastructure and logistics coordination for the 2010 Games.

In particular, costs associated with infrastructure, equipment, operations, accommodation, travel, overtime, resource reallocation, inspection and oversight would be incurred to support the implementation of the proposed aviation security Regulations. Affected partners would include Transport Canada, the RCMP, CATSA, NAV Canada and DND.

The Government of Canada has allocated $18 million to CATSA to fund training, wages, accommodation, transportation and infrastructure costs tied to this initiative.

Benefits: Identification and description

The proposed Regulations would allow a range of air traffic, aerodromes, aviation industry employees and the travelling public to continue to have access to the Greater Vancouver and Whistler areas during the 2010 Games. This would be done in a manner that not only enhances security, but also illustrates the priority the Government of Canada places on preserving the well-being of its citizens and securing its critical infrastructure.

The visibility and effectiveness of this proposal will demonstrate to G8 partners and the broader international community, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the depth of Canada’s commitment and capacity to mitigate successfully the inherent risks posed by the hosting of major events.

The successful deployment of Canada’s aviation regime would greatly reduce the risk of lives being lost to terrorism or other unlawful interference with aviation — and, by doing so, ensure the continuation of $1.5 billion a day in trade across the Canada–U.S. border and of more than 1 200 daily flights between Canada and its largest trading partner.

In addition, the creation of a 2010 Games–specific aviation security regime would leave CATSA and the Government of Canada with a legacy of 10 portable, fully equipped security screening units capable of being deployed elsewhere in Canada for future aviation security purposes.

Rationale

The safety and security of aircraft, passengers, crews and airports lies at the heart of every country’s ICAO obligations. These proposed Regulations would underscore Canada’s international commitment to aviation security.

Risk assessments conducted by police, intelligence and aviation-security experts have concluded that key elements of the multi-layered aviation security regime that large, commercial airlines currently operate under constitute a proven and effective template to address the challenges posed by smaller, unscreened aircraft operations. The proposed Regulations are designed to give users and operators of affected aircraft reasonable access to the OCA. It would do so without compromising aviation or national security — or subjecting other approved air traffic to greater risks of terrorist attacks or other threats to civil aviation.

In essence, the proposed Regulations strike a balance between Canada’s aviation and national security needs and the importance of facilitating the efficient movement of people and goods on board aircraft during a high-profile, global event. The proposed Regulations also appropriately respond to threat scenarios identified by the RCMP’s V2010 ISU, as the obligatory screening of flights would provide a proportional response to the risks of allowing such flights into the OCA.

The negative repercussions of a terrorist or other major aviation-security incident — especially an event whose risk could have been mitigated by this proposal — would have a lasting detrimental impact. Canadians could expect an immediate and dramatic “thickening” of land and air borders with the United States, for example. Canada’s reputation as a safe and secure nation would also be damaged, likely prompting other countries to impose unilaterally extra aviation security requirements on all flights from Canada.

The adverse impacts of the proposed Regulations (e.g. flight delays and rerouting, inconvenience to passengers, possible additional landing fees) are reasonable in that without the proposed mitigation regime, all unscreened commercial and private air traffic would not be permitted to operate into, from or through the OCA for 34 days.

The proposal would allow the vast majority of affected air traffic to continue to operate, albeit with some conditions. A RCMP-ordered grounding of air services that do not meet the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations would hurt the livelihood of small commercial operators (floatplanes and air taxis to small charter operations and helicopters). It would also effectively forbid larger charters and corporate aircraft from flying into Greater Vancouver.

Numerous federal departments and agencies have been engaged to help determine the most appropriate way forward for Transport Canada in balancing its aviation security mandate against its shared, broader Government of Canada responsibilities to facilitate and enable trade and to assist in the movement of people and goods. The proposed Regulations also reflect strong transborder engagement and buy-in — made necessary by the close proximity of Greater Vancouver to the Canada–U.S. border and the restricted airspace’s extension south of the 49th parallel.

Consultation

The RCMP and other security partners — CATSA, DND, NORAD, CBSA and the US FAA and TSA — have participated fully in the development of the proposed 2010 Games aviation security enhancements, including regulatory requirements.

In addition, stakeholder groups have been consulted throughout the aviation security planning process since August 2007 under the RCMP-led 2010 aviation committee. Membership includes the British Columbia Aviation Council (BCAC), the Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC), the Canadian Business Aviation Association (CBAA), the Canadian Owners and Pilots Association (COPA), the Helicopter Association of Canada (HAC), the Vancouver International Airport, and the Lower Mainland Airports Working Group.

A number of stakeholders, in particular flight training schools and small operators, expressed concern that their day-to-day operations would be adversely affected. The RCMP, Transport Canada and others worked directly with representatives from the affected sectors to assist in finding security solutions that would meet their needs.

As a result of these consultations, several additional CATSA screening sites were added to accommodate these stakeholders. In addition, classified details as to how specific proposed Regulations would translate into operating procedures continue to be refined to meet the needs of industry and affected communities.

Transport Canada continues to work with the U.S. government on developing equivalent requirements to expedite transborder Games-time operations, and continues to coordinate and cooperate with other government departments and industry on implementation.

Implementation, enforcement and service standards

Stakeholders addressed in the Consultation section were briefed in a series of formal meetings by Transport Canada and the RCMP that the RCMP-ordered OCA could affect their day-to-day operations for an unspecific period of time before, during and after the 2010 Games proper. Similarly, stakeholders have been aware of the concept of airspace restrictions through increasingly detailed presentations and briefings since the consultation period began in August 2007.

The implementation plan would include a series of incident and alarm thresholds involving police of local jurisdiction and/or the RCMP, as well as a series of escalating response protocols based on the nature of the incident and alarm. Compliance strategies and processes would include significant enforcement and inspection roles for Transport Canada Aviation Security Inspectors and a strong oversight by CATSA management personnel. The proposed Regulations would meet or exceed existing security protocols in place at the 89 aerodromes currently designated for CATSA screening. These requirements would include alarm-response obligations and detection/performance thresholds that would form the basis of Transport Canada’s enforcement and inspection protocols.

Violation of the proposed Regulations would carry the same range of monetary penalties already in place for infractions by existing regulated entities. Penalties would range to a maximum amount of $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for corporations.

Contact

Sandra Miller
Chief, Regulatory Planning and Services, Aviation Security, Regulatory Affairs
Transport Canada
330 Sparks Street
Place de Ville, Tower C, 13th Floor
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N5
Telephone: 613-998-9605
Fax: 613-990-5046
Email: sandra.miller@tc.gc.ca

Annex 1

Proposed New Screening Locations*

Designated aerodromes	Location indicator
Abbotsford Airport	CYXX
Boundary Bay	CZBB
Calgary International Airport	CYYC
Departure Bay	CAC8
Kelowna Airport	CYLW
Langley Regional	CYBJ
Nanaimo Harbour	CAC8
Pemberton	CYPS
Pitt Meadows	CYPK
Port Hardy	CYZT
Powell River	CYPW
Squamish	CYSE
Vancouver Harbour	CYHC
Vancouver Harbour (Public) — heliport	CBC7
Vancouver International Airport	CYVR
Vancouver International Airport — FBO	CYVR
Vancouver International Airport — floatplane facility	CAM9
Vancouver International Airport — heliport facility	CYVR
Victoria International Airport	CYYJ
Victoria Harbour	CYWH
Victoria Harbour (Camel Point) — heliport	CBF7
Whistler (Municipal)	CBE9

* This list was up-to-date on July 16, 2009. Additional sites may be added if deemed necessary to better accommodate industry needs and reduce impacts.

Annex 2

Portal Airports**

Abbotsford Airport

Kelowna Airport

Victoria Airport

Vancouver International

Vancouver South Terminal

** Note that additional portal airports may be added, if necessary, based on passenger volume, routes, runway length and available infrastructure and services such as de-icing, fuelling and customs services.

PROPOSED REGULATORY TEXT

Notice is hereby given that the Governor in Council, pursuant to sections 4.71 (see footnote a) and 4.9 (see footnote b) and subsection 7.6(1) (see footnote c) of the Aeronautics Act (see footnote d) and section 34 of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Act (see footnote e), proposes to make the annexed Vancouver 2010 Aviation Security Regulations.

Interested persons may make representations to the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities concerning the proposed Regulations within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice. All such representations must cite the Canada Gazette, Part I, and the date of publication of this notice, and be addressed to Sandra Miller, Chief, Regulatory Planning and Services, Regulatory Affairs Security, Aviation Security Directorate, Transport Canada, Place de Ville, Tower C, 13th Floor, 330 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0N5 (tel.: 613-998-9605; fax: 613-990-5046; e-mail: sandra.miller@tc.gc.ca).

Ottawa, July 31, 2009

JURICA ČAPKUN
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council

VANCOUVER 2010 AVIATION SECURITY REGULATIONS

OVERVIEW

Overview

1. These Regulations contain measures to enhance aviation security during the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games.

INTERPRETATION

Definitions

2. (1) The following definitions apply in these Regulations.

“cargo” « fret »

“cargo” means goods other than baggage or mail. For greater certainty, goods that are necessary for the operation or safety of an aircraft, such as extra fuel, manuals or safety kits, are not cargo.

“hold baggage” « bagages en soute »

“hold baggage” means goods that belong to a passenger and to which the passenger will not have access on board an aircraft.

“Olympic Control Area” « zone restreinte Olympique »

“Olympic Control Area” means the area described in Schedule 1.

“waiting area” « zone d’attente »

“waiting area” means an area that is used to keep passengers and goods that have been screened apart from persons and goods that have not been screened.

Terminology: Canadian Aviation Security Regulations

(2) Unless the context requires otherwise, words and expressions used in these Regulations have the same meaning as in section 1 of the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations.

APPLICATION

OCA Flights

3. These Regulations apply in respect of flights to or from an aerodrome in the Olympic Control Area. They do not, however, apply in respect of flights that

(a) are transporting persons or goods that are subject to screening in accordance with the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations and the Security Screening Order;

(b) are conducted by a police service; or

(c) are conducted under the authority of the Minister of National Defence.

Designated aerodromes

4. The aerodromes listed in Schedule 2 are designated for the purposes of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Act. These Regulations and the Vancouver 2010 Aviation Security Measure (CATSA) apply in respect of screenings conducted by CATSA at those aerodromes.

Additional checkpoints

5. These Regulations and the Vancouver 2010 Aviation Security Measure (CATSA) also apply in respect of screenings conducted by CATSA at screening checkpoints established away from the air terminal building of an aerodrome listed in Schedule 3 if

(a) the aerodrome is in the Olympic Control Area; or

(b) the checkpoints are for flights to aerodromes in the Olympic Control Area.

SCREENING

Screening requirements

6. (1) The operator of an aircraft must ensure that the following persons and goods are presented to CATSA for screening:

(a) passengers and their baggage;

(b) crew members and their baggage; and

(c) cargo.

Short turn-around exception

(2) Persons and goods that have been screened and that are on board an aircraft arriving at an aerodrome in the Olympic Control Area need not be screened again before the aircraft departs if

(a) the aircraft arrives for the purpose of deplaning passengers or unloading goods;

(b) no persons enplane and no goods are loaded on the aircraft at the aerodrome;

(c) only crew members for the flight or persons escorted by the crew members have access to the persons and goods that remain on board the aircraft; and

(d) the aircraft departs from the aerodrome as soon as possible after deplaning passengers or unloading goods.

Prohibition

7. The operator of an aircraft who is not an air carrier must not transport any persons or goods that are required to be presented to CATSA under section 6 unless those persons and goods have been screened.

Presentation of baggage

8. If the operator of an aircraft presents baggage to CATSA for screening, the operator must identify the baggage to CATSA as being either carry-on baggage or hold baggage.

Unclassified baggage

9. If baggage is presented to CATSA for screening and it is unclear whether or not it is carry-on baggage or hold baggage,

(a) CATSA must screen the baggage as carry-on baggage; and

(b) the operator of the aircraft transporting the baggage must treat it as carry-on baggage.

Persons and carry-on baggage

10. If persons and carry-on baggage are presented to CATSA for screening, CATSA must screen them for

(a) goods, other than liquids, gels and aerosols, that are listed or described in the general list of prohibited items; and

(b) other goods that pose an immediate threat to aviation security.

Hold baggage and cargo

11. If hold baggage and cargo are presented to CATSA for screening, CATSA must screen them for

(a) explosive substances;

(b) incendiary devices; and

(c) other goods that pose an immediate threat to aviation security.

Authorized means

12. To conduct the screenings referred to in sections 10 and 11, CATSA may use

(a) physical searches;

(b) metal detection equipment;

(c) X-ray equipment; and

(d) explosives detection equipment.

Access to cargo

13. If cargo must be opened to facilitate screening by CATSA, the operator of the aircraft who requested the screening must open the cargo. If the cargo is cleared by CATSA, the operator must re-seal it for transportation.

WAITING AREAS AND CONVEYANCES

Access after screening

14. The operator of an aircraft must ensure that, before a flight departs, passengers and goods that have been screened are kept apart from persons and goods that have not been screened and that only persons authorized by the operator have access to the passengers and goods.

Access to hold baggage or cargo

15. The operator of an aircraft must ensure that, before a flight departs, passengers who have been screened do not have access to hold baggage or cargo.

Search of conveyances

16. (1) If the operator of an aircraft uses a conveyance as a waiting area or to transport passengers and goods that have been screened from a screening checkpoint to the aircraft, the operator must, before screening operations start, search the conveyance for goods that could pose a threat to aviation security.

Subsequent search

(2) The operator of the aircraft must search the conveyance again for goods that could pose a threat to aviation security if, after screening operations have started,

(a) a person who is not authorized by the operator of the aircraft gains access to the conveyance;

(b) the conveyance has not been in the continuous care of the operator; or

(c) the conveyance is used to transport persons or goods that have not been screened.

Waiting area search

17. If an area of an aerodrome is used as a waiting area, CATSA must, before screening operations start, search the area for goods that could pose a threat to aviation security.

Authorized access

18. CATSA must not permit a person to pass beyond a screening checkpoint into a waiting area unless CATSA ensures that the person

(a) is authorized to enter the area by the operator of an aircraft who is using the area;

(b) is authorized to enter the area by the aerodrome operator; or

(c) is authorized by the Minister to carry out an inspection under section 8.7 of the Aeronautics Act and presents official credentials bearing the person’s name and photograph.

Prohibited items

19. CATSA must not permit a person to pass beyond a screening checkpoint into a waiting area unless CATSA ensures that the person is not in possession or control of

(a) any goods, other than liquids, gels and aerosols, that are listed or described in the general list of prohibited items; or

(b) any goods that pose an immediate threat to aviation security.

Permitted items

20. CATSA may permit a person in possession or control of a weapon, an explosive substance or an incendiary device to pass beyond a screening checkpoint into a waiting area if the person is carrying or has access to the weapon, explosive substance or incendiary device in accordance with these Regulations, a security measure, an emergency direction or an interim order.

Medically necessary goods

21. CATSA may permit a person in possession or control of goods listed or described in the general list of prohibited items to pass beyond a screening checkpoint into a waiting area if the goods are medically necessary and the person declares them to CATSA.

Medical kits

22. CATSA may permit a health care professional in possession or control of a medical kit that contains goods listed or described in the general list of prohibited items to pass beyond a screening checkpoint into a waiting area if CATSA ensures that the kit does not include sharp or cutting instruments.

SEARCH OF AIRCRAFT

Search by operator

23. (1) The operator of an aircraft must, before enplaning passengers or loading goods for a flight, ensure that the aircraft is searched for goods that could pose a threat to aviation security.

Where and what to search

(2) For greater certainty, the search must include the aircraft cabin, all cargo holds, all other storage spaces and any goods on board the aircraft.

Credentials

24. A person who conducts a search referred to in section 23 must

(a) be in possession of an active restricted area identity card that has been issued to the person; or

(b) be registered by the operator of the aircraft with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit.

Search by police

25. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the police service with jurisdiction at an aerodrome may also search an aircraft referred to in section 23 as well as any goods on board the aircraft for goods that could pose a threat to aviation security. They may do so either independently or in cooperation with the operator of the aircraft.

Authorized means

26. To search an aircraft, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the police service with jurisdiction at an aerodrome may use

(a) physical searches;

(b) metal detection equipment;

(c) explosives detection equipment; and

(d) explosives detection dogs.

Access after search

27. After an aircraft has been searched, the operator of the aircraft must ensure that only persons authorized by the operator have access to the aircraft.

ACCESS TO GOODS ON BOARD AN AIRCRAFT

Passenger access

28. (1) The operator of an aircraft must ensure that passengers for a flight do not have access to any of the following goods on board the aircraft:

(a) goods, other than liquids, gels and aerosols, that are listed or described in the general list of prohibited items;

(b) hold baggage; and

(c) cargo.

Cutlery exception

(2) The operator of an aircraft may provide passengers with knives during an in-flight meal service.

Application

29. (1) This section applies in respect of flights that are conducted by operators of aircraft who are not air carriers.

Firearms

(2) Subject to subsection (3), no person may be in possession or control of or have access to a firearm on board an aircraft.

Exception for pilots

(3) The pilot-in-command of the aircraft may be in possession or control of or have access to a firearm on board the aircraft if the firearm is required for survival purposes.

TRANSPORTATION OF FIREARMS, EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES

Application

30. Sections 31 to 33 apply in respect of flights that are conducted by operators of aircraft who are not air carriers.

Transport or tender of loaded firearm

31. (1) No person may transport or tender for transportation by the operator of an aircraft goods that contain a loaded firearm.

Transport of loaded firearm

(2) The operator of an aircraft must not knowingly allow a person to transport goods that contain a loaded firearm.

Tender of unloaded firearm

32. (1) No person may tender for transportation by the operator of an aircraft goods that contain an unloaded firearm unless the person declares to the operator that the firearm is unloaded.

Transport of unloaded firearm

(2) The operator of an aircraft must not knowingly transport goods that contain an unloaded firearm unless the firearm is transported as hold baggage or cargo.

Tender of explosive substance or incendiary device

33. (1) No person may transport or tender for transportation by the operator of an aircraft goods that contain an explosive substance, other than ammunition, or an incendiary device unless the person notifies the operator before arriving at the aerodrome.

Acceptance for transport

(2) The operator of an aircraft must not accept for transportation goods that contain an explosive substance, other than ammunition, or an incendiary device unless the operator was notified in accordance with subsection (1).

Transport of explosive substance or incendiary device

(3) The operator of an aircraft must not knowingly transport goods that contain an explosive substance or an incendiary device unless the substance or device is transported as hold baggage or cargo.

CARRIAGE OF AND ACCESS TO FIREARMS, EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES
AND INCENDIARY DEVICES AT AERODROMES

Application

34. Sections 35 to 37 apply in respect of aerodromes that do not serve air carriers and are either

(a) aerodromes in the Olympic Control Area; or

(b) aerodromes from which flights to aerodromes in the Olympic Control Area are conducted.

Firearms

35. (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (5), no person may carry or have access to a firearm at an aerodrome.

Exception for tendering for transportation

(2) A person may carry or have access to an unloaded firearm at an aerodrome for the purpose of tendering it for transportation.

Exception for operators of aircraft

(3) The operator of an aircraft or an employee of the operator may carry or have access to an unloaded firearm at an aerodrome if the firearm was tendered to the operator for transportation in accordance with subsection 32(1).

Exception for peace officers

(4) A peace officer may carry or have access to a loaded firearm at an aerodrome while in the performance of their duties.

Exception for licensed persons

(5) A person who holds a licence to carry a firearm issued under the laws of Canada may carry or have access to a firearm at an aerodrome if the person

(a) is engaged in the protection of persons or property at the aerodrome; or

(b) is employed by the aerodrome operator for the control of animals at the aerodrome.

Explosive substances or incendiary devices

36. (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (4), no person may carry or have access to an explosive substance or an incendiary device at an aerodrome.

Exception for tendering for transportation

(2) A person may carry or have access to an explosive substance or an incendiary device at an aerodrome for the purpose of tendering it for transportation if the person notified the operator of the aircraft in accordance with subsection 33(1).

Exception for operators of aircraft

(3) The operator of an aircraft or an employee of the operator may carry or have access to an explosive substance or an incendiary device at an aerodrome if the substance or device was accepted for transportation by the operator in accordance with subsection 33(2).

Exception for authorized persons

(4) A person may carry or have access to an explosive substance or an incendiary device at an aerodrome if the person is authorized to do so by the aerodrome operator.

Authorization

37. An aerodrome operator may authorize a person to carry or have access to an explosive substance or an incendiary device at the aerodrome if

(a) the substance or device will be used at the aerodrome

(i) for excavation, demolition or construction,

(ii) in fireworks displays,

(iii) by persons operating explosives detection equipment or handling explosives detection dogs,

(iv) by a police service, or

(v) by military personnel; and

(b) the aerodrome operator has reasonable grounds to believe that the safety of the aerodrome and of persons and aircraft at the aerodrome will not be jeopardized by the presence of the substance or device at the aerodrome.

NOTIFICATIONS

Application

38. (1) This section applies to operators of aircraft who are not carriers.

Notify Minister

(2) The operator of an aircraft must immediately notify the Minister if any of the following events occur:

(a) a hijacking or attempted hijacking of a flight;

(b) the discovery, on board an aircraft used to conduct a flight, of a weapon other than a firearm that is permitted under these Regulations;

(c) the discovery, on board an aircraft used to conduct a flight, of an explosive substance or an incendiary device other than a substance or device that is permitted under these Regulations;

(d) the discovery, during a search required under section 16, of a weapon other than a firearm that is permitted under these Regulations;

(e) the discovery, during a search required under section 16, of an explosive substance or an incendiary device other than a substance or device that is permitted under these Regulations;

(f) an explosion on board an aircraft used to conduct a flight;

(g) a specific threat against an aircraft used to conduct a flight;

(h) a specific threat against any part of an aerodrome or an aviation facility that is under the operator’s control for the purposes of conducting a flight; or

(i) an aviation security incident involving a peace officer in any part of an aerodrome or an aviation facility that is under the operator’s control for the purposes of conducting a flight.

Notify aerodrome operator

(3) If a weapon other than a firearm that is permitted under these Regulations is discovered in any part of an aerodrome that is under the control of the operator of an aircraft for the purposes of conducting a flight, the operator must immediately notify the aerodrome operator.

Notify Minister

39. An air carrier must immediately notify the Minister if any of the following goods are discovered during a search required under section 16:

(a) a weapon other than a firearm that is permitted under these Regulations; or

(b) an explosive substance or an incendiary device other than a substance or device that is permitted under these Regulations.

Application

40. (1) This section applies to aerodrome operators of aerodromes that do not serve air carriers and are either

(a) aerodromes in the Olympic Control Area; or

(b) aerodromes from which flights to aerodromes in the Olympic Control Area are conducted.

Notify Minister

(2) An aerodrome operator must immediately notify the Minister if any of the following events occur:

(a) the discovery at the aerodrome of a weapon other than a firearm that is permitted under these Regulations;

(b) the discovery at the aerodrome of an explosive substance or an incendiary device other than a substance or device that is permitted under these Regulations;

(c) an explosion at the aerodrome other than an explosion that is carried out for a purpose referred to in subparagraph 37(a)(i) or (ii) or that is carried out by persons referred to in subparagraph 37(a)(iii) or (v) or by a police service referred to in subparagraph 37(a)(iv);

(d) a specific threat against the aerodrome; or

(e) an aviation security incident involving a peace officer in any part of the aerodrome.

Persons and carry-on baggage

41. (1) CATSA must immediately notify the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the police service with jurisdiction at the aerodrome, the operator of the aircraft, the aerodrome operator and the Minister if it discovers any of the following goods while screening passengers and carry-on baggage for a flight in accordance with these Regulations:

(a) a weapon other than a firearm that is permitted under these Regulations; or

(b) an explosive substance or an incendiary device other than a substance or device that is permitted under these Regulations.

Hold baggage or cargo

(2) CATSA must immediately notify the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the police service with jurisdiction at the aerodrome, the operator of the aircraft, the aerodrome operator and the Minister if it discovers any of the following goods while screening hold baggage or cargo for a flight in accordance with these Regulations:

(a) a loaded firearm; or

(b) an explosive substance, other than ammunition, or an incendiary device.

Incident involving peace officer

(3) CATSA must immediately notify the operator of the aircraft, the aerodrome operator and the Minister if an aviation security incident involving a peace officer occurs in any part of an aerodrome where screening is being conducted by CATSA for a flight in accordance with these Regulations.

DESIGNATED PROVISIONS

Designated Provisions

42. (1) A provision of these Regulations that is set out in column 1 of Schedule 4 is designated as a provision the contravention of which may be dealt with under and in accordance with the procedure set out in sections 7.7 to 8.2 of the Aeronautics Act.

Amounts payable

(2) The amount set out in column 2 or column 3 of Schedule 4 is prescribed as the maximum amount payable by an individual or corporation, as the case may be, in respect of a contravention of the provision set out in column 1.

Notice of contraventions

43. A notice referred to in subsection 7.7(1) of the Aeronautics Act must specify the information set out in section 4 of the Designated Provisions Regulations.

REPEAL

44. These Regulations are repealed.

COMING INTO FORCE

January 29, 2010

45. (1) These Regulations, except for section 44, come into force at 00:00:01 Pacific Standard Time on January 29, 2010.

March 3, 2010

(2) Section 44 comes into force at 23:59:59 Pacific Standard Time on March 3, 2010.

SCHEDULE 1
(Section 2)

OLYMPIC CONTROL AREA

OCA components

The Olympic Control Area is composed of the South Area, the Sea-to-Sky Corridor and the North Area.

South Area

The South Area is bounded by a line

(a) starting at N49°07′14.71″, W122°52′17.99″;

(b) from there to N49°07′14.71″, W122°51′19.49″;

(c) from there to N49°00′07.50″, W122°51′19.49″;

(d) from there along the border between Canada and the United States to N49°00′07.50″, W123°19′54.97″;

(e) from there clockwise along the arc of a circle of 13 miles radius centred on N49°11′42.00″, W123°10′55.00″, the airport reference point of Vancouver International Airport, to N49°20′11.18″, W123°25′57.17″;

(f) from there to N49°20′08.72″, W123°15′37.38″;

(g) from there to N49°20′04.85″, W123°03′25.40″;

(h) from there to N49°18′50.00″, W122°54′20.04″; and

(i) from there clockwise along the arc of a circle of 13 miles radius centred on N49°11′42.00″, W123°10′55.00″, the airport reference point of Vancouver International Airport, to N49°07′14.71″, W122°52′17.99″.

Sea-to-Sky Corridor

The Sea-to-Sky Corridor is bounded by a line

(a) starting at N49°47′41.00″, W123°19′44.00″;

(b) from there to N49°56′25.41″, W123°18′02.26″;

(c) from there counterclockwise along the arc of a circle of 13 miles radius centred on N50°04′46.00″, W123°02′35.00″ to N49°51′51.39″, W123°00′19.16″;

(d) from there to N49°41′30.00″, W123°00′00.00″;

(e) from there to N49°32′15.00″, W123°06′14.00″;

(f) from there to N49°18′50.00″, W123°01′44.09″;

(g) from there to N49°20′04.85″, W123°03′25.40″;

(h) from there to N49°20′10.99″, W123°25′56.81″;

(i) from there to N49°34′06.00″, W123°29′55.00″; and

(j) from there to N49°47′41.00″, W123°19′44.00″.

North Area

The North Area is bounded by a line

(a) starting at N50°17′20.18″, W122°57′28.01″;

(b) from there to N50°21′38.66″, W122°49′50.81″;

(c) from there clockwise along the arc of a circle of 13 miles radius centred on N50°18′09.00″, W122°44′16.00″, the aerodrome reference point of Pemberton, to N50°14′33.29″, W122°38′51.10″;

(d) from there to N50°10′30.93″, W122°44′27.55″; and

(e) from there clockwise along the arc of a circle of 13 miles radius centred on N50°04′46.00″, W123°02′35.00″ to N50°17′20.18″, W122°57′28.01″.

SCHEDULE 2
(Section 4)

DESIGNATED AERODROMES

Name	Location Indicator
Boundary Bay	CZBB
Langley Regional	CYNJ
Nanaimo Harbour	CAC8
Nanaimo Harbour (Departure Bay)	CAC8
Pemberton	CYPS
Pitt Meadows	CYPK
Port Hardy	CYZT
Powell River	CYPW
Squamish	CYSE
Vancouver Harbour	CYHC
Vancouver Harbour (Public) — heliport	CBC7
Vancouver International Airport — FBO	CYVR
Vancouver International Airport — floatplane	CAM9
Vancouver International Airport — heliport	CYVR
Victoria Harbour	CYWH
Victoria Harbour (Camel Point) — heliport	CBF7
Whistler (Municipal)	CBE9

SCHEDULE 3
(Section 5)

AERODROMES WITH ADDITIONAL SCREENING CHECKPOINTS

Name	Location Indicator
Abbotsford Airport	CYXX
Calgary International Airport	CYYC
Kelowna Airport	CYLW
Vancouver International Airport	CYVR
Victoria International Airport	CYYJ

SCHEDULE 4
(Section 42)

DESIGNATED PROVISIONS

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
Subsection 6(1)	5,000	25,000
Section 7	5,000	25,000
Section 8	5,000	25,000
Paragraph 9(a)		25,000
Paragraph 9(b)	5,000	25,000
Section 10		25,000
Section 11		25,000
Section 13	5,000	25,000
Section 14	5,000	25,000
Section 15	5,000	25,000
Subsection 16(1)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 16(2)	5,000	25,000
Section 17		25,000
Section 18		25,000
Section 19		25,000
Subsection 23(1)	5,000	25,000
Section 24	5,000	25,000
Section 27	5,000	25,000
Section 28	5,000	25,000
Subsection 29(2)	5,000
Subsection 31(1)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 31(2)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 32(1)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 32(2)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 33(1)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 33(2)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 33(3)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 35(1)	5,000
Subsection 36(1)	5,000
Subsection 38(2)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 38(3)	5,000	25,000
Section 39	5,000	25,000
Subsection 40(2)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 41(1)		25,000
Subsection 41(2)		25,000
Subsection 41(3)		25,000

[33-1-o]

Footnote a
S.C. 2004, c. 15, s. 5

Footnote b
S.C. 1992, c. 4, s. 7

Footnote c
S.C. 2004, c. 15, s. 18

Footnote d
R.S., c. A-2

Footnote e
S.C. 2002, c. 9, s. 2

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